and u + = max(u , 0). Now consider F,G ∈ such that F (x ) ≤ G (x ) for all x ≥ 0, i.e., F firstorder stochastically dominates G . Then, Theorem 2.1 in Brumelle and Vickson (1975) 
increasing, W (F ) ≥ W (G ).
Finally, note that, if g and u are both differentiable, for any interior bundle f ,
If f = 1 S x for some x > 0, then
i.e., ∂ V (1 S x ) = {∇V (1 S x )} = g (u (x ))u (x ) + g (x ) · P , as asserted.
E.2 Calculations for the examples in Sections 2.1 and 2.3
We first verify that the specification of adjustment factors and function in Section 2.3, together with a uniform baseline prior, ensures strong monotonicity. The same argument applies to the simpler specification in Section 2.1; we only indicate the minor, required modifications.
We use Eq. (19): first, note that
Hence,
Letting t = |φ j |, this is less then one iff t < 1 + θ −1 t 2 , i.e. iff t 2 − θ t + θ > 0. We study the function t → t 2 − θ t + θ for t ≥ 0. If t = 0, the function takes the value θ , so we need θ > 0.
The derivative of this function at any t > 0 (which is also the right derivative at 0) is 2t − θ , which shows that this function is strictly convex and has a minimum at t = 
Similarly, in states s = s 3 , s 4 , ζ 0 (s ) = 0 and ζ 1 (s ) ∈ {1, −1}, so To adapt the argument to the preferences in Section 2.1, consider only states s 1 and s 2 .
We now show that, if θ increases, the resulting preference is more GM-ambiguity-averse.
By the characterization result in Siniscalchi (2009) , it suffices to show that A(φ) is decreasing in θ for every φ. Differentiating A(φ) with respect to θ ,
it suffices to show that, for every j and φ j , log(
, so we need to show that log(1+t ) > t 1+t . Both functions equal zero at t = 0. For t > 0, the derivatives of the lhs and rhs are 1 1+t and
We finally turn to the analysis of the specific parameterization in Section 2.3. The four acts
have the same expected baseline utility: P (u • f k ) = 2α + 1 for k = 1, . . . , 4. Hence, their ranking is entirely determined by the adjustment terms
These are displayed in Table 2 .
In order to generate the preferences f
, this will also ensure that respectively. Thus, we require
We now derive a condition on θ that ensures that the above inequality holds.
E.3 SPC, DQC and notions of aversion to ambiguity
In this appendix, we discuss how conditions SPC and DQC (introduced in Appendix C) are related to notions of aversion to ambiguity that have been discussed in the literature. We start from DQC, as the "decomposability" assumption V = I • u is standard in previous work.
DQC
First, we reiterate that DQC is strictly weaker than convexity in utilities, i.e. uncertainty aversion à la Schmeidler (1989) . (Similarly, SPC is strictly weaker than convexity in consumption,
i.e., preference for diversification.) The examples in Section 2 illustrate these points.
Second, when I is regular, ambiguity aversion in the sense of GM implies DQC. In general, the latter is strictly weaker: see Example 3 in Appendix A. However, DQC implies GMambiguity aversion under an additional condition that, for instance, is implied by TIC (Definition 2). Similar results hold for condition SPC and a general V .
Third, Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) We now provide formal statements and proofs. First, consider a preference that admits a representation of the form V = I • u , such that (I , u ) satisfy Assumption 2.
Remark 7
If ∩ x >0 C (1 S x ) = and DQC holds, then Core I = . In particular, this is the case if V satisfies TIC and DQC holds.
; this exists by standard arguments.
, by strong monotonicity
Under Assumption 2 and DQC, Proposition 12 implies that V satisfies Assumption 1 and SPC. Hence, by Proposition 8, for every x > 0, C (1 S x ) = π(1 S x ) and V is nice at 1 S x . Therefore,
Putting these conditions together, since TIC holds,
Remark 8 (Preference for sure EU diversification) Suppose that DQC holds. Then, for all bundles f 1 , . . . , f N and weights α 1 , . . . , α N ≥ 0 such that i α i = 1, if f i ∼ f j for all i , j , and there exists
. . , N , and x as in the statement. Let y ≥ 0 be such that f i ∼ y for all i ; this exists by standard arguments. If y = 0, then f i = 0 for all i , so x = 0 because u is strictly increasing; then, trivially,
SPC
Now consider a preference that admits a representation V that is not (necessarily) of the form I • u. We maintain Assumption 1; in addition, for the first two results, we will assume that V is normalized: that is, V (1 S x ) = x for all x ≥ 0. Notice that V can then be interpreted as a certainly-equivalent functional:
The strict core of V is the set SCore
For instance, if V is the certainty-equivalent function of an EU preference with strictly positive beliefs P and a strictly concave utility u, then for all
Therefore, a non-empty strict core captures a notion of strict risk/ambiguity aversion.
Remark 9
If V is normalized, nice, and regular at certainty (i.e. at every 1 S x , x > 0), and
The proof mimics that of Corollary 13 part 2, with some additional subtleties.
Now suppose that f is non-constant. As in the proof of Corollary 13 part 2, it is enough
as required. Notice that, while
because the argument of P and V is non-constant when f is, this may not be true in the limit as t ↓ 0. Thus, the first inequality is weak. However, the last inequality is strict, because f is non-constant and P ∈ SCore V .
Remark 10
If V is normalized, ∩ x >0 C (1 S x ) = , and SPC holds, then SCore V = .
Proof: Let P ∈ ∩ x >0 C (1 S x ) and consider f non-constant. Let x ∼ f , which exists by standard
Hence, in particular, 
The inequality is strict because Q (f i − 1 S y ) > 0 for at least one i . Since Q (S ) > 0 because V is nice at 1 S y by assumption, x > y . Hence, x y ∼ f i for each i .
E.4 Decomposable representations: Examples
All the following examples feature preferences which have a "decomposable" representation
The first example illustrates that the conditions in Theorem 3 are strictly more general than those discussed in Appendix C. The second example demonstrates that the conditions in Appendix C may be restrictive when combined with specific assumptions about the functional I . The third example shows that the strict quasiconcavity property of Eq. (7) is strictly weaker than SPC.
Example 3 Let S = {s 1 , s 2 }. We define the function V :
2 + → , depicted in Figure 5 , in three steps.
First, we define W 1 :
Note that the slope of the indifference curve of W 1 going through the point 1 S x (drawn as a dashed black line in 
Thus, for bundles f near the certainty line, V (f ) = W 1 (f ). However, since the indifference curves of W 2 are flat, whereas those of W 1 bend inward, for bundles f sufficiently far from the 45
Fix an arbitrary, strictly concave function u : + → , and assume that I : u (X ) 2 → is strictly monotonic and such that V = I • u . We argue that I is not quasiconcave, and its core is empty; thus, neither condition 1 nor condition 2 in Corollary 13 applies.
Consider two bundles f , g such that V (f ) = V (g ) = W 2 (f ) = W 2 (g ): that is, f and g lie on the same indifference curve for V , in a region where V coincides with W 2 (see Figure 5 ).
Since in that region the indifference curve is linear, V (
However, for every state s , since u is strictly concave and f (s ) = g (s ) because indifference curves are not parallel to the axes, u(
The details are as follows. Since the indifference curve of W 2 is linear, it consists of points f = (f 1 , f 2 ) such that
αx . Hence the indifference curve of W 2 going through 1 S αx has equation
αx . Since any f ∈ 2 + lies on a unique indifference curve, and each indifference curve is parameterized by x , the value of W 2 (f ) for an arbitrary f ∈ 2 + can be computed as follows. First, find the unique x such that f satisfied the linear equation parameterized by x ; this can be done numerically, using any one-dimensional search algorithm. Second, note that then f lies on the same indifference curve as 1 S αx , so by assumption 
but then, I is not quasiconcave. . Since x = y implies P x = P y , Core I = .
Finally, we show that Condition SPC is satisfied. Suppose that (1 S y ) ; this is the case for the points labelled f , x , y in Figure 5 . Then y ≥ x , and f lies on an indifference curve for W 2 that is parallel to, but higher than the indifference curve for W 1 through 1 S y , and hence also higher than the indifference curve for W 1 through 1 S x . But this means that, again, (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004) if its representation (I , u ) is such that I is positively homogeneous and constant-additive on its domain: for all α ∈ and β ∈ + , I (α + β a ) = α + β I (a ) (this implies that I is Lipschitz with constant 1 and normalized). We now show that MEU preferences are the only invariant biseparable preferences for which condition DQC in Appendix C holds.
Example 4 (Invariant Biseparable preferences) A preference is invariant biseparable
Recall from Ghirardato et al. (2004) 
, and finally define I : u (X )
Since all the probabilities defined above are strictly positive, I is strictly increasing. It is also invariant biseparable. Furthermore, we can normalize u so that u (0) = 0 and u (1) = 1. By
Proposition 12, V = I • u satisfies Assumption 1.
We show that V is strictly quasiconcave at every 1 S x , x > 0 (i.e., Eq. (7) holds at certainty).
at least one strict inequality. Since I is strictly increasing, I (u
This proves the claim.
Since I is invariant biseparable but not concave, 3 Example 4 implies that it does not satisfy DQC. We now show that, in addition, V fails SPC. Let g = (1, δ, 0), where u (δ) = 1 − ε. Then we
However, p 32 ∈ C (1 S x ) and
the inequality holds because, by strict concavity of u ,
and since u is strictly increasing, δ < 1 − ε.
With reference to Example 4, the preference described here is invariant biseparable and satisifies strict quasiconcavity at every 1 S x , x > 0 (cf. Eq. (7)), but is not MEU.
It is an open question whether strict pseudoconcavity at certainty may hold for invariant biseparable preferences that are not MEU.
E.5 Examples: Convex preferences
We conclude with two examples with convex preferences. Example 6 shows that, even when all preferences are strictly convex, a non-empty intersection of the supporting-probabilties sets π i (·) at every full-insurance allocation is necessary for risk sharing. Example 7 instead illustrates how risk sharing may obtain when TIC fails-that is, when Theorem 3 applies but 4 does not. Agent 2 has EU preferences, with probability P and utility u 2 (x ) = x 0.8
. Figure 6 shows indifference curves for these preferences, drawn as solid blue and red lines respectively. Agent 1's and 2's indifference curves are tangent at the allocation (1 S x l , 1 S (x − x l )); their common slope there equals the slope of the two parallel, straight purple lines. (Thus, this slope identifies P .)
Agent 2 has EU preferences, with probability P and utility u 2 (x ) = x 0.8 . Figure 6 shows indifference curves for these preferences, drawn as solid blue and red lines respectively. Agent 1's and 2's indifference curves are tangent at the allocation (1 S x l , 1 S (x x l )); their common slope there equals the slope of the two parallel, straight purple lines. (Thus, this slope identifies P .) Figure 6 : A convex preference with empty core.
The figure shows that the slope of 1's indifference curves at 1 S x l and 1 S x h is different;
indeed, it may be verified that the slope of the indifference curve of I at 1 S is 2 +2 for every > u 1 (0); this is non-zero and strictly decreasing in . Hence, I is nice at certainty. Furthermore, since I is quasiconcave and u 1 is strictly concave, V 1 = I u 1 satisfies SPC by Corollary 13, and therefore by Proposition 16, ⇡ s 1
singleton set. On the other hand, since agent 2's preferences are consistent with EU, ⇡ s 2
From a decision-theoretic perspective, we observe that agent 1's preference is uncertaintyaverse in the sense of Schmeidler, 1989 , because I is quasiconcave; however, it is not GM- (1 S x ) = π 1 (1 S x ) = C 1 (1 S x ) for all x > 0. In particular, π 1 (1 S x ) is a singleton set. On the other hand, since agent 2's preferences are consistent with EU, π
From a decision-theoretic perspective, we observe that agent 1's preference is uncertaintyaverse in the sense of Schmeidler, 1989 , because I is quasiconcave; however, it is not GMambiguity-averse. 4 To see this, note that, by Corollary 13 part 1, together with Corollary 20 in Appendix C, the core of I must be contained in the sets π 1 (1 S x ) for all x > 0, but as noted above these sets are all singleton (hence, non-empty) and different for different x , so Core I = . For the same reason, TIC fails.
Turn now to risk sharing. The assumptions of Theorem 3 hold. The purple line going through x l corresponds to a shared supporting probability: that is,
However, the purple line going through x h is tangent to agent 2's indifference curve, but does not support agent 1's indifference curve: therefore, π 1 (1 S x h ) does not intersect π 2 (1 S (x − x h )).
Thus, condition (iv) in Theorem 3 is violated. Correspondingly, conditions (ii) and (iii) also fail: the allocation (g , 1 Sx −g ) is Pareto-efficient, but does not provide full insurance, whereas the interior, full-insurance allocation (1 S x h , 1 S (x − x h )) is not Pareto-efficient. 
